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Dialogues@RU is published
annually
by the
Writing Program at
Rutgers, The State
University of New Jersey
Volume 4
Fall 2005
Genetic Enhancement: Distinctions And Regulation - Page 2
Virginia Mensah
Such is the case in vaccination, where the immune system inherited by each individual is bolstered by exposure to weakened agents of disease. In doing so, an individual acquires preemptive immune improvement in an attempt at prevention (Juengst 133). Moreover, as a logical extension, the President's Council on Bioethics cites the possibility that "[f]arther in the future, genes that confer resistance to particular pathogens (perhaps anthrax or smallpox) might be added . . . to protect a population from attacks with biological weapons" ("Staff Background Paper" 4). Vaccination and genetic manipulations in these instances improve an individual's functioning ¾ specifically, they give ways to enhance the immune system. Therefore, since it is possible to view this treatment intervention as enhancement, should it be classified as a "bad" use of technology and thereby regulated? Some might argue "it is misleading to call this intervention 'enhancement' . . . it would neither be therapy nor enhancement but instead a form of maintenance" (Glannon 95). As maintenance, vaccination would fall within the realm of medicine. Maintenance, however, implies allowing the body's natural defenses to combat a previous exposure to disease. This is clearly not the case in vaccination where the body is given a novel defense against a previously unknown or unexposed disease. Hence, this point of view is innately flawed, not only because it fails to refute vaccination as a case in which the distinction does not exist, but also because it denies prevention both as a form of treatment and as an important aspect of medicine. Vaccinations and other forms of genetic therapy, as treatments that entail improvement of an otherwise adequate system, are both commonly accepted means of preventative medicine and forms of enhancement. The reluctance of individuals like Glannon to classify interventions such as strengthening the immune system as enhancement supports a negative connotation and motivates the aversion that many individuals have to the concept of genetic alterations. Nevertheless, because of the sometimes-overlapping values of treatment and enhancement, the bounds of medicine cannot be the sole basis for labeling enhancement as harmful and thereby enforcing regulation. Although establishing a "regulatory framework to separate legitimate and illegitimate uses" ( Fukuyama 6) provides a logical means to moderate therapeutic applications of genetic medicine, there is not necessarily always a clear-cut difference between the two. Perhaps more importantly, the distinction is misplaced.
The real distinction that needs to be defined and regulated is not the difference between treatment and enhancement, which can be one in the same, but rather the difference between enhancement that is treatment and enhancement that is self-serving. It is the latter to which many object and should be wary of. Unlike enhancement, which seeks to treat disease or deficiency, self-serving enhancement seeks the technology to bestow genetic benefits for selfish social interests. After all, as Fukuyama warns, "as we discover not just correlation, but actual molecular pathways between genes and traits like intelligence, aggression, sexual identity. . . and the like, it will inevitably occur to people that they can make use of the knowledge for particular social ends" (6). Thus, self-serving enhancement interests are not divergent from treatment of a disorder; instead, an individual attempts to acquire enhancement to improve social, political, or economic status. For instance, unlike the case of vaccination, the possibility exists that some genetic therapies will be used in the improvement of biological functions unrelated to disease. An excellent example is the "introduction of the gene for IGF-1 into muscle cells with resulting great increases in muscle health, strength, and efficiency . . . Strong interest in using muscle enhancing gene techniques is expected to come from athletes, the elderly, and young people interested in increasing their physical attractiveness" ("Staff Background Paper" 3). Clearly any of these uses of genetic technology would be overtly detectable, illegitimate enhancement since, rather than the treatment of a disorder like muscular dystrophy, the applications would extend to use by those who do not need it to gain adequate functioning:. The use of genetic enhancement in this instance falls outside of the domain of medicine. For such cases, an appropriate course of action would be to enact legislation to prohibit application of self-serving enhancement.