 |
|
Dialogues@RU is published
annually
by the
Writing Program at
Rutgers, The State
University of New Jersey
Volume Three
Spring 2004
Confronting Terror: Reasserting Ethical Resolve over Political Realism - Page 7
by Anthony Vitali
Response: Anthony Vitali
In his dialectical response to “Confronting Terror,” Dialogues editor Ryan Gogol gets right to the heart of the matter when he asserts that, “in so far as Vitali has shown just-war theory to evolve over time in the Judeo-Christian tradition, we should also not, then, assume that Islam is a stagnant religion without recourse to novel interpretations of the Koran.” I would argue that even a cursory look at mainstream media coverage would compel one to recognize that the so- called “Arab-street” foments in fervent support of what Gogol suggests may be restricted to only novel interpretations of Qur’anic dicta ¾ lest we forget the scope and cost of the attacks of September 11 by presuming that it merely represents an interpretation of novel proportion and not the symptom of a larger malady. Gogol’s contention concerning the lack of argumentative consistency he observes in Qur’anic principles for the use of force in spreading the dar al-islam (the abode of peace) should not detract from the widespread interpretation that the existence of such a principle does both in theory and practice offer the ethical foundation upon which Islamic fundamentalists have quite successfully built a large base of terror. Gogol’s notion that caution exercised to the highest degree may well trump moral resolve seems fairly rooted in common sense; however, caution when anchored solely in the ebb and flow of pure political realism, without orientation by a resolute ethical compass, stands precariously perched on the precipice of providing a strategy of exculpation for de facto moral impotence. In turn, while simultaneously ignoring and consistently failing to effectively confront the evil-doers of terror with a firm ethical posture we eschew any obligation to assert power as exemplary leaders acting in the defense of human dignity on decidedly just grounds. Gogol’s admonition that “it would be wrong to interpret extremist jihad as comprising any part of the ethical traditions of rational Muslims” begins to elucidate the challenge inherent in confronting Islamic fundamentalists with appeals to the universality of reason, but fails to accurately indict the fundamental ethics of the jihad of the sword tradition as the location of the more substantive issue at hand. Furthermore, the Qur’anic exhortations of peace, cited by Gogol, also fail to account for the fact that these exhortations constitute conceptions of peace that are at odds with those who exist outside the dar al-islam.
In addition, Gogol suggests that the “call for moral resolve in Western foreign policy and a meaningful debate between Western and Islamic traditions . . . can also work against the pursuit of a more principled war on terrorism.” Without elaboration on their specific origin and the cross-cultural viability of such principles, their actual validity and applicability in enabling what Gogol calls, “the pursuit of a more principled war on terrorism” is reminiscent of the type of high purpose sentiment that lacks any real actionable strength. Such well-intentioned rhetoric appears to be rooted in a desire to put cooperation between “allies” in the spirit of internationalism ahead of taking decisive action with moral resolve on behalf of justice for all and in defense of human dignity. This is both unfortunate (in ethical terms) and politically confounding, particularly when such international “allies” fail to take ethical responsibility and have competing political motives (e.g., France’s lack of support for the war on terrorism).
I would argue that there is a moral imperative for the West, and most specifically America, to lead the fight against the propagation of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. This moral imperative is predicated on what Jean Bethke Elshtain, in her book Just War Against Terror rightly expounds: “The first American foundational principle is moral equality: All human beings are created equal and are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights” (26). The critical distinction to be made for application to the current issue is that this concept allows, in principle, the distinction between principle and practice. Thus, America can, as Elshtain writes, “use a founding principle to defeat practices that violated that principle” (27). As a result, this foundational principle suggests what Elshtain points out, “In a decent polity, our prejudices should be challenged rather than reinforced by our principles . . . . [Thus] the ability of the American polity to use its own tradition’s commitments to eliminate abhorrent practices tells us [that]. . . . Thinking politically requires looking at both principles and practices and considering how they do, or do not, conform to one another” (28 ). Fundamentalist Islam fails to make such a critical distinction. Furthermore, as Elshtain asserts, “International bodies have defaulted on the use of coercive force on behalf of justice as an equal regard for all, hence a basic defense of human dignity” (168). Therefore, I would argue that the extension of this principle of moral equality in defense of human dignity and as the fundamental ethic of humanity requires the United States, as the world’s superpower, to as Elshtain writes, “deploy coercive force [in their behalf]. . . if they are victims of one of the many horrors attendant upon radical instability [like that which is predominant in fundamentalist Islamic regimes, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan]” (168). This concept of what Elshtain calls, “equal regard [is, indeed] an idea of international justice whose time has come” (168).
Essentially, what this amounts to is the acceptance of a paramount ethical responsibility that is consistent with the fundamental Christian just war ethic, which as Elshtain properly writes, “evaluate[s] all cries for justice and relief from people who are being preyed upon, whether by non-state marauders (such as the Al Qaeda terrorists) or by state-sponsored enforcers [such as the Taliban and Baathist regimes] . . . [as these] ethical considerations are themselves central to our national interests, correctly understood” (170). The author continues, “It is our long-term national interest to foster and sustain an international society of equal regard. . . . Strategic necessity and moral requirements here meet” (170). Our failure to assert this moral imperative and foster a real debate across the most pertinent ethical traditions, rooted in religion as they are, will result in a moral default away from what I believe is a decidedly accurate understanding of Christian just war tradition. Such a default would be tantamount to unbalancing the scales of quintessential justice perilously toward evil.
Page One - Page Two - Page Three - Page Four - Page Five - Page Six - Page Seven