 |
|
Dialogues@RU is published
annually
by the
Writing Program at
Rutgers, The State
University of New Jersey
Volume Three
Spring 2004
Confronting Terror: Reasserting Ethical Resolve over Political Realism - Page 4
by Anthony Vitali
The Christian holy war idea or the idea of war for and from religion can be traced back to the fourth century and Ambrose Bishop of Milan, as Professor Johnson has explained (Lectures 2003). In an attempt to refute the Christian pacifists, Ambrose laid the groundwork for early just war thought by distinguishing between the use of force for oneself and the use of force to protect and defend those wrongly attacked. Drawing from the requirement of Christian charity, Ambrose argued that Christians had a moral duty to “defend thy neighbor,” and failing to meet this requirement would be morally wrong. Thus, Ambrose provided the first theological rationale for the use of armed force and, in doing so, laid the foundation upon which just war tradition was constructed (Johnson 2003).
In the latter fourth and early fifth centuries, Ambrose’s contemporary Augustine forwarded just war tradition by arguing for the allowance of Christians to engage in warfare in defense of their neighbors of the state. Despite not constructing a coherent body of doctrine on just war (Johnson 2003), he did by virtue of his argument forward the foundational ideas from which such doctrine has grown. Augustine’s work marks the early connection of just war tradition to state authority. The sixth century canonist Gratian defines the primary standards set forth to determine just cause as defense against wrongdoing in progress, punishment of evildoers, and the retaking of wrongly taken properties. The Decretists and the Decretalists, followed by the thirteenth century writings of Thomas Aquinas, held true to Augustine and Gratian’s Decretum, thus exhibiting an early medieval consensus of just war thought (Johnson 2003).
Johnson argues that the medieval period punctuates the major shift in just war concept to an emphasis on socio-political order. Medieval theologians accepted the aforementioned foundational ideas of just war theory and contributed to it the notion that sovereign rulers were both right and dutiful in their authority to wage war justly to correct violations of justice. This shift in just war perspective to the state was essentially rooted in the desire to establish a just and peaceful socio-political order (Lectures 2003). The modern period, Johnson argues, brought two distinct challenges to the developing legacy of the medieval period, which failed to develop consensus on just war applications beyond the scope of the Christian faithful. These challenges were the discovery of the New World and the Reformation. More specifically, both the discovery of the New World and the Reformation forced the examination of just war thought in an attempt to derive how to apply just war thinking to conflicts beyond Christianity. In the mid-sixteenth century, just war theorist Franciscus de Vitoria directly addressed the question of whether and how armed force might be used to advance the Christian religion through forced conversion by rejecting wholesale the idea that offensive force may be justified for religious purposes (Johnson 2003). Vitoria denied the concept of religious justification for offensive holy war and imposed limitations on just war, as defined solely by their appeal to the universality of reason. Subsequently, the post-Reformation period ushered in a full cultural rejection of holy war, which was largely predicated on a sense of revulsion at the sheer brutality of such endeavors. This reaction to war for religion completed the cultural rejection of such practices in the future and made the right to holy war a non-issue for just war tradition (Johnson 2003).
As recognized in Roman practice, incorporated into Christianity, and acknowledged by classical just war theologians, Vitoria reasserts the three deontological justifications for armed force: punishment of evildoers; defense against an ongoing wrongdoing; and the recovery of properties wrongfully taken. Vitoria’s reshaping of just war tradition is consistent with James Turner Johnson’s analysis in his essay “Just Cause Revisited.” “His conception of just cause was based in natural law, not in a mix of natural law and Christian moral duty; its central paradigm was not the sovereign acting in God’s stead to punish evil . . . but rather the state acting to defend and preserve itself and its rights” (“Just Cause” 11). This reshaped perspective on just war in employing the traditional just causes via natural law for state interests caused an inevitable confounding of just cause theory in practice. Simply stated, both sides of a given conflict now had the ability to make reasonable appeals to just cause.
These cases of what Johnson calls “simultaneous ostensible justice-wars in which there appears to be just cause on both sides” (“Just Cause” 12) were dealt with by Vitoria, and later the canonist Hugo Grotius, by, in effect, not dealing with the contradiction and instead emphasizing new arguments for limits on war conduct or jus in bello. Furthermore, Grotius advances the argument for preemption as just cause exhibiting a position that as Johnson writes, “reflects the assumption that protection of justice centrally requires protection of the state, an assumption that led to an emphasis on the just cause of defense that is thoroughly modern” (“Just Cause” 13). Responding to concerns about the exploitation of preemption, Grotius develops safeguards to govern against unwarranted offensive applications. In doing so, Johnson argues, Grotius establishes tenets from which the development of international law and the positive law of war have followed (Lectures 2003).
Nineteenth century innovations changed the face of modern warfare. The doctrine of “presumption against war” supports the view that modern warfare is inherently unjust by virtue of its disproportionately destructive nature. This view as forwarded by contemporary Catholic thought provides insight into the perspective that war itself is the evil to be avoided. As a result, international law and treaties have sought to remove all traditional just cause requirements including preemption, leaving only just war in defense of an armed attack (Johnson 2003).
Page One - Page Two - Page Three - Page Four - Page Five - Page Six - Page Seven