 |
|
Dialogues@RU is published
annually
by the
Writing Program at
Rutgers, The State
University of New Jersey
Volume Two
Spring 2003
Thought, Belief, and Instinct
- Page 2
by Albert Min
Rabinow, in offering Foucault's method for research, does not give any explicit philosophical account of truth. There are, however, possible theories that he implies by the methodology he proposes. One such possibility is the coherence theory of truth offered by postmodernist philosophers as described in "Postmodernism: The Most Recent Coherence Theory" in an entry entitled "Truth" in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Rehearsing the details of the theory is not necessary for this paper, but it is important to note the theory's emphasis on the social and political aspect of truth. The entry describes the theory as having "received a more sympathetic reception among social scientists than among physical scientists." The entry refers to the different ends that physical and social scientists have in mind. Physical scientists are more concerned with the certainty of their theoretical claims and hard facts whereas social scientists are more likely to be concerned with the effective value of their theoretical claims in explaining and treating social phenomena without vying for the objective reality of their theories. The entry offers an example:
Social scientists will more easily agree, for example, that the proposition that human beings have a superego is a "construction" of (certain) politically influential psychologists, and that as a result, it is (to be regarded as) true. In contrast, physical scientists are-for the most part-rather unwilling to regard propositions in their own field as somehow merely the product of consensus among eminent physical scientists. They are inclined to believe that the proposition that protons are composed of three quarks is true (or false) depending on whether (or not) it accurately describes an objective reality. They are disinclined to believe that the truth of such a proposition arises out of the pronouncements of eminent physical scientists. In short, physical scientists do not believe that prestige and social influence trump reality.
The passage above reflects the differences in methodologies that come about as a result of the different ends that are sought by social and physical scientists. The former are interested in the "construction" of truth, while the latter are more interested in "objective reality" and assume the construction of truth as a natural fact. What is important about this passage is its portrayal of the different roles and aspects of truth that are emphasized by the differing interests of each group. Rabinow seems to accept the construction of truth only insofar as its social, historical, and political effects are concerned. He attempts to maintain objectivity through the analysis of these effects. Rabinow's analysis seems to be built upon his specific interest or project, but in the process of laying out his methodology he seems to deemphasize the importance of the unified and universal notions that are involved in philosophy and religion. What is necessary, then, is to show how he does this.
Rabinow's analysis is problematic because of its connections to postmodernism's project of decentralization and its involvement with Foucault's poststructuralism. Although the methodology he proposes is useful because it does not rely on a centralized doctrine that excludes possibilities outside the doctrine's range, it is also limited by not acknowledging what must be assumed-the role of the nonobjective and intentional subject as an agent. Within the domain of philosophy this would be considered a kind of phenomenological approach, and this approach, though not necessary within the domain of study that Rabinow is interested in, is important within the broader context of the meaningful world and its human inhabitants. The limitation can be seen specifically by analyzing a passage in which Rabinow quotes Rorty describing the project of epistemology: "The desire for a theory of knowledge is a desire for constraint-a desire to find 'foundations' to which one might cling, frameworks beyond which one must not stray, objects which impose themselves, representations which cannot be gainsaid" (234). Rorty traces "epistemology as the study of mental representations" back to a "desire" for constraint within foundations or frameworks (234). Rabinow analyzes Rorty's claim in terms of the constraints within foundations or frameworks, but he does not analyze "desire," which might provide some insights. The analysis of the desire points the way towards understanding the role of the subject in and the values or meanings, created by the subject, necessary for truth formation.
Page One Page Two Page Three Page Four Page Five